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obtained the checks payable to Ramsey and deposited them in Hancock's account at First 
Security Bank. 
3. First Security Bank - Defendant/Appellee. First Security is the bank where 
Hancock maintained an account into which the checks were deposited. Ramsey is not an 
account holder of First Security. 
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First Security Bank, N.A. ("First Security"), a defendant and appellee in the above 
captioned case, submits this brief pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3-
(2)0(2001). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
AND CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issue 
Did the trial court err in dismissing the negligence claim of appellant, Tom 
Ramsey ("Ramsey"), against First Security by holding that a depository bank owes no 
duty of care to a non-customer payee of checks? 
Standard of Review 
The issue presented by Ramsey involves a question of law, and therefore it 
is subject to a de novo review under a correctness standard. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 
1999UT20,Tf9,979P.2d317. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The issue presented on appeal is governed by the common law and, contrary to 
Ramsey's statement of the law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-303 and 70A-4-207 are 
inapposite for neither statute defines a depository bank's obligations towards non-
customer payees. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Ramsey's Complaint against First Security alleges that First Security "was 
negligent in depositing the checks presented by Defendant, Bruce Hancock." R. at 4, 
1f 19. Specifically, Ramsey alleges that "Defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 
breached its duty of care in that it failed to take reasonable steps available to it to 
ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements of the checks and failed to cause 
Defendant, Bruce Hancock to endorse the checks before accepting the checks for deposit 
or cashing." R. at 4. Hancock was an account holder at First Security who deposited 
checks into his account. Ramsey was not the account holder, but was the payee of the 
checks. The checks were written by Ogden Livestock on its account at Zions Bank. R. at 
2-3 K 11. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court 
Ramsey filed his negligence action against First Security on August 20, 1999, in 
the Second District Court of Weber County, Utah. R. at 1. The Summons and Complaint 
were served upon First Security one month later, on September 20, 1999. R. at 9. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), First Security filed a motion to dismiss the 
Complaint on October 8, 1999, for failure to state a claim, because as a matter of law, 
First Security owes no duty of care to non-customers, such as Ramsey. R. at 12-20. See 
also Addenda C and D attached to the Brief of Appellant (hereafter "Appellant's Brief). 
The trial court granted First Security's motion on the briefing in a Decision dated 
December 6, 1999. R. at 46 (also Addendum F to Appellant's Brief.) 
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On December 14, 1999, Ramsey filed a Motion for Trial Judge to Supplement 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss seeking clarification from the trial court on the basis 
for the order of dismissal. Ramsey contended that that First Security's motion provided 
two alternative bases for dismissal—that First Security had been incorrectly identified in 
the Complaint as "First Security Bank of Utah, N.A." and that First Security did not owe 
Ramsey a duty of care. R. at 48-49 (also Addendum G to Appellant's Brief.) This 
motion was denied on November 2, 2000, by Memorandum Decision in which the trial 
court stated that the "plaintiff [sic] in arguing their motion to dismiss only raised one 
issue in their memorandum of substance." R. at 63 (also Addendum H to Appellant's 
Brief.) 
On November 27, 2000, Ramsey prematurely filed a Notice of Appeal which was 
voluntarily dismissed by order of the Utah Supreme Court on January 10, 2001. R. at 65-
66 and 73 (also Addenda I and J to Appellant's Brief.) 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Ramsey against the remaining 
defendant, Hancock, on June 5, 2002, and, on June 25, 2002, Ramsey filed a second 
Notice of Appeal. R. at 123-128 (also Addenda N and O to Appellant's Brief.) 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issue Presented on Appeal 
1. In 1997, Hancock, maintained a personal checking account at First 
Security. R. at 2 4 9. 
2. During 1997, Hancock presented to First Security several checks 
drawn on Zions First National Bank and payable to the order of Ramsey for deposit in 
Hancock's personal checking account R. at 2 and 4, ^f 9-10, 19. 
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3. Ramsey alleges that Hancock forged Ramsey's endorsement on the 
checks prior to presenting them to First Security. R. at 2-3, Tf 11. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in dismissing Ramsey's Complaint for negligence 
against First Security because First Security owed no duty of care to Ramsey, a non-
customer, with respect to checks deposited by Hancock, the account-holder. See, e.g., 
Volpe v. Fleet Nat'I Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1998) ("a bank is not liable in 
negligence to a non-customer payee for having failed to ascertain whether a check paid 
by it bears the payee's genuine endorsement but is liable to its customer for the 
mishandling of that customer's account"); IBP, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank ofTopeka, 6 F. 
Supp.2d 1258, 1265 (D. Kan. 1998) ("nearly every court has reasoned that a bank owes 
no duty of care to a non-customer with whom it has no relationship"). Ramsey has cited 
no cases which provide otherwise, relying instead upon inapposite case law and statutory 
authority related to a bank's duty to its customers or account holders. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the trial court must dismiss a cause of action 
"where it clearly appears that the plaintiff... would not be entitled to relief under the 
facts alleged or under any state of fact [he] could prove to support [his] claim." Prows v. 
State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). The trial court correctly dismissed Ramsey's 
negligence claim against First Security because First Security owed no duty of care to 
Ramsey with respect to the checks deposited by Hancock. 
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A. To Establish His Negligence Claim, Ramsey Must Identify a Legal Duty on 
the Part of First Security. 
Under Utah law, to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Slisze, 1999 UT 20, | 9, 979 P.2d 317; Cruz v. 
Middlekauf Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Utah 1996); CT. v. Martinez, 
845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992). Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be 
determined by the Court. Slisze, 1999 UT 20, t 9, 979 P.2d 317; C.T., 845 P.2d at 247; 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). "Absent a showing of duty, [the 
plaintiff] cannot recover.5' Slisze, 1999 UT 20, \ 9, 979 P.2d 317 (quoting AMS Salt 
Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997)). Based upon the 
allegations in the Complaint, Ramsey cannot establish that First Security owed him a 
duty of care because Ramsey was not the account holder at First Security, nor did he have 
any contractual relationship with First Security in relation to these checks. Dismissal of 
his Complaint against First Security, accordingly, was not in error. 
B. First Security Owed No Duty of Care to Ramsey, a Non-Customer Payee. 
The majority of courts to have considered whether a bank accepting deposits owes 
a duty of care to a non-customer payee hold that no such duty exists. Utah should follow 
this same rule of law. 
1. The Well-Established Rule of Law is that a Bank Owes No Duty of 
Care to a Non-Customer Payee. 
"[A] bank is not liable in negligence to a noncustomer payee for having failed to 
ascertain whether a check paid by it bears the payee's genuine indorsement but is liable 
to its customer for the mishandling of that customer's account." Volpe, 710 A.2d at 664 
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{citing Roy Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, 325 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995)). This rule is based on the legal principle that there is no privity between a 
bank and a non-customer and that the bank does not owe a stranger a duty of care. 
"[N]early every court has reasoned that a bank owes no duty of care to a non-customer 
with whom it has no relationship." IBP, 6 F. Supp.2d at 1265. 
The negligence theory relied on by Ramsey has been rejected by a majority of 
jurisdictions. In Schleicher v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 314 N.W.2d 293, 297 
(N.D. 1982), a payee sued the bank which cashed a check allegedly bearing a forged 
signature. The payee sued on a negligence theory alleging that the bank had a duty to the 
payee to compare the signature of the payor on the check with the bank's signature card 
to determine whether or not it had been forged. Id. In dismissing the plaintiffs 
complaint, the court held that the bank did not owe a duty of care to the payee, who was 
not a customer of the bank. Id. The bank's duty only extends to customers or those with 
whom the bank has a relationship. See also Weil v. First Nat'l Bank of Castle Rock, 983 
P.2d 812 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999)("a bank does not owe such duties of care to a 
noncustomer"); Miller-Rogaskaf Inc. v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 931 S.W.2d 655, 664 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996)(in which the court dismissed the plaintiffs negligence claim 
because the plaintiff "was not a customer of either bank, nor did it have a relationship 
with either bank."); Bank ofPolska Kasa Opieki, S.A. v. Pamrapo Savings Bank, S.L.A., 
909 F. Supp. 948, 956 (D.N J. 1995); Roy Supply, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 325; E.F. Button 
Mortgage Corp. v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 678 F. Supp. 567, 583 (D. Md. 1988); 
Pennsylvania Nat 7 Turf Club, Inc. v. Bank of West Jersey, 385 A.2d 932, 936 (NJ. 
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Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)(fc'In the absence of evidence of any agreement, undertaking or 
contract between [the payee] and [the bank] from which any special duty can be derived, 
the improper handling of the [payor's] account cannot in the abstract serve as a stepping 
stone for liability to [the payee]."); Gesell v. First Natl City Bank of New York, 260 
N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965); Anschutz v. Central Natl Bank of Columbus, 
112 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Neb. 1961). When considering challenged endorsements of non-
account holders, the rule makes perfect sense—the bank does not have available to it the 
non-account holder payee's signature card in order to verify the allegedly forged 
indorsement of the payee. For this reason, courts do not impose a duty of care upon the 
bank towards the non-account holder payee. 
The facts alleged by Ramsey in the Complaint do not give rise to any duty owed 
by First Security to Ramsey. Hancock, not Ramsey, was the account holder at First 
Security. Hancock deposited the checks into his own account. Ramsey and First 
Security have no relationship, contractual or otherwise, in relation to these checks. In the 
absence of such a relationship, Ramsey cannot establish that First Security owed him a 
duty of care, and Ramsey cannot state a negligence claim against First Security. 
Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal of Ramsey's negligence claim, the only claim he 
alleges against First Security, was correct and appropriate. 
Unable to dispute First Security's interpretation of the law, Ramsey attempts to 
distinguish the case law claiming that the cases do not apply to the facts of this action. 
However, Ramsey's attempts to distinguish the numerous cases cited by First Security 
are unpersuasive. For example, in Anschutz v. Central Valley National Bank of 
7 
Columbus, 112 N.W.2d 545 (Neb. 1961), the payee of certain checks sued the bank on 
which the checks were drawn and deposited, alleging that the bank negligently allowed 
deposit by a third-party with the forged endorsements of the payee. Id. at 546. The trial 
court dismissed the payee's claims on demurer. Id. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court affirmed, stating that any claim for forged endorsement is a claim by the drawer of 
the check against the drawee bank, not the payee, because the drawer "is in privity of 
contract with the drawee bank." Id. at 550. In our case, Ramsey is the payee of the 
checks, not the drawer, and First Security is the depository bank, not the drawee bank. 
Without support in the case law, Ramsey argues that, in our case, First Security 
"knew the forger and consequently was able to verify the forgers [sic] signature on the 
checks." Appellant's Brief at 25. In other words, Ramsey argues that because First 
Security had on file a signature card on which Bruce Hancock had signed his name 
"Bruce Hancock," then First Security should be held responsible for identifying that a 
check with the endorsement "Tom Ramsey" was in fact endorsed by Bruce Hancock, 
writing "Tom Ramsey." Such a standard of care, besides being a practical impossibility 
to meet, is in no way supported by Anschutz or any of the case law cited by the parties. 
Moreover, there is no question that the holding in Anschutz is that the "lack of privity 
between the payee of a check and the drawer bank prevents liability." Id. at 550. 
Similarly, without offering any analysis, Ramsey contends thaXE.F. Hutton 
Mortgage Corp v. Equitable Bank N.A., 678 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1988) "has no 
relevance to this case." Appellant's Brief at 25. However, Hutton is relevant, persuasive 
authority in support of First Security's position. In Hutton, Hutton alleged numerous 
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claims against the bank, including negligence, in an attempt to recover losses suffered as 
a result of fraudulent conduct by a mortgage loan originator and servicer. Id. at 583. 
Because Hutton was not a customer of the bank, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the bank holding that it "owed no duty to Hutton arising as a result of the 
improper conduct of [the mortgage loan originator and servicer]." Id. The same is true in 
the present case. First Security owed no duty of care to Ramsey, a non-customer, arising 
out of the allegedly improper conduct of Hancock, its customer. 
Ramsey incorrectly contends that in Bank Polska Kasa Opieka v. Pamrapo Sav. 
Bank, 909 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1995), a case relied on by First Security in support of its 
motion to dismiss, the "Court did not address the issue of whether the bank had a duty to 
a non-customer of the bank on a forged endorsement." (Appellant's Brief at 27.) Like 
the present case, in Bank Polska, an individual wrote a check on an account at the 
plaintiff bank payable to a third party, forged an endorsement and deposited the check at 
the defendant bank. Id. at 950. The plaintiff bank, as the drawee bank, sued the 
depository defendant bank under a negligence theory asserting that it was negligent in 
accepting the check for deposit. Id. The court granted the defendant bank's motion for 
summary judgment explaining that "[the defendant bank] cannot be liable to [the 
plaintiff] in negligence because, as a depository bank, it had no direct dealings with [the 
plaintiff] and therefore owed it no duty." Id. at 956. This holding is consistent with First 
Security's argument in the present case. 
Ramsey also argues, without analysis, that Schleicher v. Western State Bank of 
Devil's Lake, 314 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1982) "has no relevance as to the case on appeal." 
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(Appellant's Brief at 26.) However, in Schleicher the court held that a bank that 
exchanged a check payable to plaintiff with a cashier's check, was not liable for 
negligence as a result of the fact that the check contained an allegedly forged 
endorsement of the payor. Id. at 294. In granting the bank's motion for summary 
judgment, the court held that "the Bank did not have a duty to the payee of a forged 
check to compare the signature of the payor with its signature card in order to determine 
the authenticity of the payor's signature, where the payee is not a customer or depositor." 
Id. at 297. Ramsey's attempt to distinguish this case is unpersuasive. 
In Pennsylvania National Turf Club, Inc. v. Bank of West Jersey, 385 A.2d 932 
(N.J. 1978), Zeek wrote checks on his account at the Bank of West Jersey. Zeek cashed 
the checks at the Pennsylvania Nat'l Turf Club, and the Turf Club deposited the checks at 
another bank. When a number of Zeek's checks were returned unpaid, the Turf Club 
sued the Bank of West Jersey. Id. at 198. The trial court ruled against the Bank. On 
appeal, the appellate court reversed as to claims based on common law, rather than 
statutory duties, and found in favor the bank, explaining that the bank "owed no general 
duty to [the plaintiff]" a non-customer of the bank. Id. at 203. Thus, this case confirms 
the basic doctrine that no general duty exists to non-customers. 
In Roy Supply Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309 (Cal. App. 
1995), Roy Supply, an account holder, sued its bank, Wells Fargo, claiming that Wells 
Fargo paid checks written on the account with forged signatures of the maker. Id. at 311. 
In addition, Edward Roy, the President of Roy Supply, sued Wells Fargo on a theory of 
negligence. Id. at 312. The bank demurred to Edward Roy's negligence claim, and the 
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trial court dismissed this claim, explaining that "the Bank did not owe a duty of care to 
Roy individually as he was not a customer of the Bank." Id. at 312. The appellate court 
affirmed. Id. at 325. 
Ramsey has not cited any case establishing a duty owed by a bank to the non-
customer payee as alleged in this case. Rather, Ramsey argues that the volume of checks 
in this case raises an issue as to whether First Security acted reasonably in accepting the 
checks for deposit. (Appellant's Brief at 17 and 29.) However, whether First Security 
failed to act in a reasonable manner is irrelevant unless Ramsey first establishes that First 
Security owed him a duty of care. "The primary flaw in [Plaintiffs] negligence theory is 
that none of the [banks] had any relationship with [the Plaintiff]." Software Design and 
Application, LTD v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 756, 760 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996)(in which the court dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence claim against the defendant 
bank because the bank did not have a contractual relationship with the plaintiffs). 
Absent a duty, First Security's care, or alleged lack of care, is irrelevant.1 Id. at 762 (fact 
that bank violated its own internal procedures irrelevant where the plaintiffs failed to 
establish that the bank owed the plaintiffs a duty of care). 
2. Utah Case Law is Consistent With the Rule Followed in Other 
Jurisdictions. 
Although no Utah decision squarely addresses the issue raised on this appeal, a 
prior decision from the Utah Supreme Court indicates that Utah is likely to follow the 
1
 Ramsey is not without a remedy. He can pursue collection of his judgment obtained 
herein against Hancock. Additionally, he can pursue claims against the issuer of the 
checks based upon whatever obligation, if any, the checks were intended to pay. 
11 
majority approach. In the trial court, Ramsey cited in support of his argument the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 161 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). Ramsey has not cited this Utah Supreme Court decision in his 
appellate brief. Arrow does not support Ramsey's argument, but rather is consistent with 
the conclusion that duties of care run to the bank's customers, not to a non-customer 
payee of checks, such as Ramsey. 
Arrow analyzes a relationship and duty different from that alleged by Ramsey, and 
adopts the corollary to the rule of law at issue in this case. In Arrow, the Court held that 
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103(l), a bank owes a duty of ordinary care to anyone 
with whom it has a contractual relationship, regardless of whether the bank is acting in 
the particular transaction as a collecting bank, payor bank or depositoiy bank. Id. at 938 
(citing National Bank v. Brandon State Bank, 337 So.2d 990, 992 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) 
(bank owed a duty of care to its customer under § 4-103(1) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code) and C-KEnter, v. Depositors Trust Co., 438 A.2d 262, 264 (Me. 1981) ("[T]he 
Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty of ordinary care and good faith on banks in 
their dealings with customers [UCC § 4-103]").) Accordingly, in Arrow, the Utah 
Supreme Court extended the duty of ordinary care explicitly imposed on "collecting 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103(l) provides that the provisions of Article 4 may be varied 
by contract: 'The effect of this chapter may be varied by agreement but the parties to the 
agreement may not disclaim a bank's responsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to 
exercise ordinary care, or limit the measure of damages for the lack of failure. However, 
the parties may determine by agreement the standards by which the bank's responsibility 
is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable." 
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banks" by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-202 to apply to banks in all their transactions with 
customers and individuals with whom the bank had a contractual relationship. Arrow, 
767P.2dat938. 
However, in keeping with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-103(1), which discusses 
agreements between banks and its customers, the duty extends only to customers, or 
those with whom the bank has a contractual agreement. Id. at 939. For example, in 
Arrow, the relationship giving rise to the duty was founded upon an explicit oral 
agreement between the plaintiff and the bank. Id. at 936, 939 ("By agreeing to pay [the 
plaintiffs] checks whenever funds entered [its depositor's] account, [the bank] arguably 
permitted [the plaintiff] to reasonably assume that [the bank] would act in good faith and 
ordinary care."). There is no basis in Arrow for extending such a duty to noncustomers. 
Indeed, the Arrow court cited with approval at least one case from a jurisdiction adopting 
the rule that the duty of care does not extend to noncustomers. See W.B. Farms v. 
FreemontNat'lBank and Trust Co., 756 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1985)(applying Nebraska 
law)/ Thus, although Utah courts have not answered the specific question raised in this 
appeal, the Arrow decision indicates that Utah would adopt the majority position adopted 
by the trial court in this case. 
3
 SeeAnschutz v. Central Natl Bank, 112 N.W.2d 545 (Neb. 1961)(liability of bank 
extends only to the customer with whom the bank deals and with whom the bank is in 
privity of contract). 
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3. Ramsey Has Not Identified Any Authority Which Imposes a Duty of 
Care Upon First Security With Respect to Non-Customer Payees. 
In addition to attempting to distinguish the case law upon which First Security 
relies, Ramsey cites on appeal, three new cases and statutory authority not discussed in 
the trial court. None of this authority strengthens Ramsey's position or imposes liability 
based on the relationship alleged by Ramsey in this case. In fact, at least one case cited 
by Ramsey supports the rule that no duty is owed to a non-customer payee. 
a. The Case Lawr Ramsey Identifies is Inapposite. 
Ramsey cites on appeal three cases, which purportedly support the fact that "[a] 
number of jurisdictions have ruled that a depository bank is liable to a non-customer by 
reason of their accepting checks bearing a forged endorsement." (Appellant's Brief at 
21.) However, none of the cases cited by Ramsey support the duty alleged by Ramsey in 
this case. 
For example, ALG, Inc. v. Estate ofEldred, 35 P.3d 931, 933 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2001), cited by Ramsey, supports the trial court's dismissal of Ramsey's claim. In that 
case, ALG's employee embezzled money by writing checks on various accounts held by 
ALG, including an account maintained at Boatmen's Bank, and depositing the checks in 
the employee's account also at Boatmen's Bank. Id. at 933. The employee wrote a total 
of 138 checks, 25 of which were drawn on ALG's account at Boatmen's Bank. Id. 
Although the court permitted ALG to pursue a claim against Boatmen's Bank with 
respect to the 25 checks drawn on ALG's Boatmen's Bank account, it denied liability as 
to the 113 remaining checks which were drawn on other banks, explaining: 
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By their legal argument as set out above, plaintiffs have abandoned 
all claims the district court erred in denying their motion with 
respect to the 113 checks. A ''depository bank" is the "first bank to 
take an item even though it is also the payor bank, unless the item is 
presented for immediate payment over the counter." UCC § 4-
105(2). A "payor bank" is the "bank that is the drawee of a draft." 
UCC § 4-105(3). The "payor bank" is also referred to as the 
"drawee bank." In this case, Boatmen's was the depository bank not 
the payor bank on all of the 113 checks. Plaintiffs were not in a 
customer-payor bank relationship with Boatmen's with respect to 
these 113 checks. 
UCC § 4-401 sets no standard of care for depository banks. Rather 
it sets the standard of care the pay or/drawee bank owes its customer. 
Plaintiffs conceded this point at oral argument but ask this court to 
extend the principles of UCC § 4-401 to depository banks. This we 
cannot do for it would involve judicial rewriting of the UCC. 
Id. at 934 (emphasis added). The bank's only liability in ALG was with respect to those 
checks for which it was the payor bank and thus owed a duty to its customer, the account 
holder. Conversely, Ramsey is not a customer of First Security and First Security was 
the depository bank, not the payor or drawee bank. ALG is entirely consistent with First 
Security's argument that Ramsey cannot state a claim against First Security in this case. 
Ramsey also relies upon Casarez v. Garcia, 660 P.2d 598 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
However, in Casarez the liability of the bank was predicated on its status as a "drawee" 
of the check. Id. at 602. Here, however, First Security is not the drawee of any check, 
nor does Ramsey allege First Security was the drawee. Rather, it is the bank at which the 
checks were deposited. Casarez thus is inapposite. 
Finally, Ramsey relies on Medford Irrigation District v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 
329 (Ore. Ct. App. 1984). However, in Medford, the claim against the bank was asserted 
by an account holder, not a non-customer. The court correctly ruled that as between a 
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bank and its customer, the account holder, the bank may only charge the customer's 
account if the instrument is properly payable. Id. at 332. Medford does not advance 
Ramsey's claim that First Security owed Ramsey a duty of care because Ramsey is not an 
account holder at First Security. 
None of the three cases upon which Ramsey relies identifies the duty of care 
alleged by Ramsey in this case. 
b. Ramsey May Not State a Claim Under the UCC Sections 
Cited. 
For the first time on appeal, Ramsey additionally argues that certain provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code support his negligence theory against First Security. 
None of these provisions advance Ramsey's claim because they describe duties owed in 
relationships that do not exist between First Security and Ramsey. 
Although it is not clear how he believes the argument supports his negligence 
claim, Ramsey states that "Section 70A-3-203(3) Utah Code Annotated does not aid First 
Security Bank because there was never a valid negotiation." (Appellant's Brief at 20.) 
Section § 70A-3-203 of the Utah Code, cited by Ramsey, is wholly irrelevant to this case. 
That section deals with the rights as between a transferor and transferee of an instrument. 
In this case, Hancock, not Ramsey, is the alleged transferor of the instruments to First 
Security, as transferee. Ramsey has no rights in the instruments because he never had 
possession of the instruments. 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 defines a "person entitled to enforce an instrument" as 
"the holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has rights 
of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instalment who is entitled to enforce the 
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Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207, Ramsey further argues that First 
Security has "breached the warranties that were made." (Appellant's Brief at 21.) 
However, Section 70A-4-207 is likewise inapplicable to this case. This provision 
describes warranties made by those who transfer items for collection. The warranties run 
in favor of subsequent transferees of the items. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207(l). 
Ramsey is not a transferee of the items and can not make any claim relating to these 
statutory warranties. Even assuming such a claim was legally recognizable, Ramsey's 
Complaint does not purport to allege such a claim, but only alleges a claim of negligence 
against First Security. Having failed to assert this cause of action against First Security, 
Ramsey is precluded from raising it on appeal. 
Ramsey has not cited any legal support for the duty alleged in his Complaint. First 
Security did not owe a duty of care to Ramsey with respect to the allegedly forged 
endorsements. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Ramsey's Complaint against First Security 
because the facts alleged by Ramsey do not give rise to a duty on the part of First 
instalment pursuant to Section 70A-3-309 or Subsection 70A-3-418(4) . . ." Section 
70A-3-201(l) of the Utah Code explains that when possession of the instrument is 
transferred, the transferee becomes a "holder." In this case, Ramsey was never a 
"holder" of the instalments and never had rights to enforce the instruments. Indeed his 
Complaint alleges no rights in the instruments. Rather, his claim is limited to an 
allegation of negligence. 
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Security. Accordingly, First Security respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court dismissing Ramsey's Complaint against First Security for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2003. 
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